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VIRGINIA'S NEW STATE HABEAS: WHAT EVERY ATTORNEY NEEDS TO KNOW
BY: GREGORY J. WEINIG
Early in 1995, the Virginia legislature fundamentally changed the
state habeas corpus system. The changes not only affect the basic habeas
procedure, but have far-reaching ramifications for all areas of state
habeas practice as well. After an explanation of how the new system
works procedurally, this article wil address administrative issues (such
as retroactivity, how the new evidentiary hearings will function, and
what legal standards will apply); how the new system affects the task of
habeas counsel, particularly the impact on time available forreinvestiga-
tion; and finally, the new system's relation to important federal habeas
issues. 1
I. THE NEW SYSTEM
The old state habeas procedure was quite simple. After the conclu-
sion of the direct appeal process by petition for writ of certiorari to the
United States Supreme Court, a petitioner sentenced to death had to
follow the sameprocedure as any other state habeas petitioner in Virginia
by applying to the circuit court of the county or city in which he had been
convicted. 2 Upon denial of relief, a discretionary petition forappeal went
to the Supreme Court of Virginia, and then again to the United States
Supreme Court.
The new section of the principal state habeas statute created a
separate procedure for death penalty petitioners. 3 Other existing code
sections were amended and new statutes drafted.4 Apparently designed
to save time, the new provisions initially require petitioners to apply to
1 For an excellent source of comparison regarding important issues
under the old system, see Hobart, State Habeas in Virginia: A Critical
Transition, Capital Defense Digest, Vol. 3, No. 1, p. 2 3 (1990).
2 Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-654(A) (Supp. 1994).
3 The new provision states:
1. With respect to any such petition filed by a petitioner held under
the sentence of death, and subject to the provisions of this subsection, the
Supreme Court shall have exclusive jurisdiction to consider and award
writs of habeas corpus. The circuit court which entered the judgment
order setting the sentence of death shall have authority to conduct an
evidentiary hearing on such a petition only if directed to do so by order
of the Supreme Court.
2. Hearings conducted in a circuit court pursuant to an order issued
under the provisions of subdivision 1 of this subsection shall be limited
in subject matter to the issues enumerated in the order.
3. The circuit court shall conduct such a hearing within ninety days
after the order of the Supreme Court has been received and shall report
its findings of fact and recommend conclusions of law to the Supreme
Court within sixty days after the conclusion of the hearing. Any objection
to the report of the circuit court must be filed in the Supreme Court within
thirty days after the report is filed.
Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-654(C) (1995).
4 The text of these amendments and new sections will each be set
forth in full when appropriate in the article, infra.
5 Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-654(C) (1995); Va. Code Ann. § 17-97
(1995).
6 Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-163.7 (1995), which states in relevant part:
If the sentence of death is affirmed on appeal, the court shall, within
thirty days after the decision of the Supreme Court of Virginia, appoint
the Supreme Court of Virginia instead of the circuit courts.5 Fortunately,
state habeas petitioners facing a death sentence are now statutorily
guaranteed appointment of counsel. 6 Under the old law, a petitioner
received counsel for state habeas only upon request.7 The attorney must
work quickly, however. The Supreme Court of Virginia will not even
consider the petition unless it is filed within sixty days of one of three
events: eithertheUnited States Supreme Court's denial ofcertiorari from
a petitioner's direct appeal; or that Court's affirmance of a petitioner's
direct appeal; or the expiration of the period for timely filing a petition
for certiorari to that Court.8
If the petitioner files on time, the Supreme Court of Virginia then
decides whether the issues the petitioner raised wan-ant an evidentiary
hearing. 9 The court must now give the same docket priority to these state
habeas death penalty cases that it formerly had to grant only to death
penalty cases on direct appeal. 10 If the court decides the petition does
warrant an evidentiary hearing, the case is sent to the proper circuit court.
The circuit court is limited to hearing only those issues which the
Supreme Court enumerated in its order. 11
The circuit court must conduct that hearing within ninety days after
the Supreme Court of Virginia's order. After the hearing, the circuit court
makes findings offact and recommended conclusions of law. 12 Then the
circuit court reports those findings of fact and recommended conclusions
of law to the Supreme Court of Virginia within sixty days after the
hearing is completed. Objections to the report filed by the circuit court
must themselves be filed with the Supreme Court of Virginia within
counsel from the same list, or such other list as the [Public Defender]
Commission may establish, to represent an indigent prisoner under
sentence of death in a state habeas corpus proceeding. The Attorney
General shall have no standing to object to the appointment ofcounsel for
the petitioner.
Apparently, it is the circuit court in which a petitioner was first
convicted which must appoint him counsel after the Supreme Court of
Virginia affirms the sentence on direct appeal, i.e., the word "court"
refers to the circuit court.
7 Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-163.7 (Supp. 1994).
8 Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-654.1 (1995). This is a new statute, with no
counterpart under the old system.
9 Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-654(C)(1) (1995).
10 Va. Code Ann. § 17-110.2 (1995). Compare Va. Code Ann. § 17-
110.2 (Supp. 1994). Docket priority for deathpenalty cases can seriously
harm a petitioner's chances of obtaining relief. For example, docket
priority greatly shortens the time available to habeas counsel to reinves-
tigate a case. See section 111, infra. Petitioners can also argue that such a
quickened process is unconstitutional since a petitioner should be al-
lowed to decide not to have his case granted docket priority so that he may
exercise constitutional guarantees meaningfully. See, e.g., Gideon v.
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45
(1932); Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967) (regarding right
to effective assistance of counsel);Ruetz v. Lash, 500 F.2d 1225 (7th Cir.
1974) (equal protection and due process); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S.
238 (1972).
11 Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-654(C)(2) (1995).
12 Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-654(C)(3) (1995).
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thirty days after the circuit court's filing.13 The petition is then decided
in the Supreme Court of Virginia. Thereafter, prisoners may petition for
certiorari to the United States Supreme Court. However, if during its
initial review of the petition the Supreme Court of Virginia decides that
a petition does not warrant an evidentiary hearing, that court summarily
denies the petition. The petitioner may then petition for certiorari to the
United States Supreme Court.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the new state habeas system
also includes a statute dictating when execution dates will be set after a
petitioner exhausts state habeas appeals.14 The trial court sets an execu-
tion date after notification by the Attorney General or Commonwealth's
Attorney, and after the occurrence of one of the following four events: (1)
denial of state habeas relief by the Supreme Court of Virginia or
expiration of the time for applying for such relief; (2) final disposition of
the case in the United States Supreme Court on certiorari from denial of
state habeas; (3) affirmance of denial of federal habeas corpus relief by
the United States Court of Appeals or expiration of the time for appealing
such denial; (4) issuance of a final order by the United States Supreme
Court after granting a stay to address a petition for certiorari appealing
the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals.
15
The trial court must then hold a proceeding within ten days of the
Attorney General's written request to set the execution date, and then the
court must set a date within sixty days of that proceeding. 16 After a date
is scheduled, the trial court or the Supreme Court of Virginia may grant
a stay of execution only if the petitioner makes a showing of substantial
grounds for habeas corpus relief. 17 Formerly, execution dates were not
governed by statute. The Commonwealth's practice was not to seek
oppressively quick execution dates. It petitioned courts to set such dates
only when it felt the defense had delayed filing habeas corpus petitions




Questions of retroactivity inevitably arise when a new statute
amending old procedures is passed. Obviously these questions are
extremely important in death penalty cases. Whole phases of appeal once
available to defendants under the old law have changed, and because of
the uncertain "limbo" status of cases pending at state habeas before the
amendments, some petitioners may find themselves facing entirely
different procedures than expected. Equally important, the new appoint-
ment of counsel statute raises similar retroactivity issues and thus further
questions regarding how death row inmates petitioning at state habeas
will be ensured assistance of counsel.
13 Id. This requirement raises the question of whether a petitioner
must contest the findings of fact at this point in the process. A circuit
court's findings of fact are final; note that Va. Code Ann. §8.01-
654(C)(3) distinguishes between the circuit court's "findings of fact and
recommended conclusions of law" by failing to qualify the circuit court's
findings of fact as "recommended." If a petitioner waits until the
Supreme Court of Virginia upholds the death sentence and then petitions
in federal court, the Commonwealth could claim that the petitioner did
not take the opportunity to object at the proper time. As such, the circuit
court's findings of fact would stand in federal court, and under 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254(d), federal courts must defer to state court findings of fact.
14 Va. Code Ann. § 53.1-232.1 (1995).
15Id.
16 Va. Code Ann. § 53.1-232.1 (1995).
17 Id.
1. Cases Pending Before Statute's Effective Date
The new amendments became effective on July 1, 1995, when
several cases at the initial stage of the old state habeas proceedings were
already pending before the proper circuit courts. Several other cases had
been denied a petition for certiorari by the United States Supreme Court
on direct appeal before July 1,1995, but the individuals in those cases had
not yet filed state habeas petitions. The Attorney General of Virginia
opined that the new statute divested the circuit courts of their jurisdiction
over these cases. 19 The Supreme Court of Virginia has agreed with the
Attorney General in part, recently promulgating new rules to address this
issue. Under those new rules, the individuals who had not yet filed state
habeas petitions after denial of certiorari have six months from July 1,
1995 to file a petition with the Supreme Court of Virginia (i.e., until
January 1, 1996).20 In habeas cases pending in the circuit courts as of July
1, however, the circuit courts were directed to order the case and entire
record transferred to the Supreme Court of Virginia.
2 1
As to the latter class of cases, however, promulgation of the new
rules does not necessarily mean that the new procedures described here
must apply. This is especially true where substantive rights of prisoners
who had already filed under the old system may be affected. Virginia
Code section 8.01-1 provides that new statutes apply retroactively to
causes of action arising before the statute's effective date, but conditions
this application by mandating that the former law "shall apply if in the
opinion of the court any particular provision [of the new law] (i) may
materially change the substantive rights ofa party (as distinguished from
the procedural aspects of the remedy) or (ii) may cause the miscarriage
of justice."22
The circuit courts may have already ordered, but not yet held,
evidentiary hearings in some cases before the new statute and rules went
into effect. In other cases, the circuit court may have held one hearing and
been ready to hold another one. Discovery may have already been
ordered. The new rules direct that such cases be transferred to the
Supreme Court of Virginia, where the circuit court's orders and decisions
to conduct hearing could, in effect, be voided.23 This change is not
merely procedural since many claims which would have been heard
under the old system would not be heard under the new system. Argu-
ably, the new statute has therefore effectively changed the substantive
rights of these petitioners.
The new system can change the substantive rights of petitioners
who had cases pending before the circuit courts in another way as well.
The statutes greatly hasten the process as a whole, leaving little time for
habeas counsel to reinvestigate their clients' cases. This is especially a
concern given the difficulty of discovering the factual bases for typical
habeas claims (such as withholding of exculpatory evidence and police
and prosecutorial misconduct) and the requirement that such claims be
18 See McFarland v. Scott, 114 S. Ct. 2568 (1994), and case
summary of McFarland, Capital Defense Digest, Vol. 7, No. 1, p. 11
(1994) (discussing execution dates and appointment of counsel under
former Virginia practice).
19 Telephone Interview with Michelle Brace, Staff Attorney of the
Virginia Capital Representation Resource Center (September 25, 1995).
Ms. Brace's assistance with this article was invaluable. We appreciate
that she realized the importance of informing counsel about several
issues connected with the new statute.
20 Va. Sup. Ct. R. 5:7A(h) (1995).
21 Va. Sup. Ct. R. 5:7A(i) (1995).
22 Va. Code § 8.01-1 (1992).
23 Va. Sup. Ct. R. 5:7A(i) (1995).
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included in all habeas petitions to avoid default. Consequently, many
petitioners whose cases are transferred under the new rules have grounds
to contest any substantive abridgement of rights resulting from the
transfer.24
2. Cases Presenting Problems with Dates for Appoint-
ment of Counsel and Filing of Petitions
The statute governing appointment of counsel in capital cases has
been amended to require appointment of counsel for state habeas corpus
proceedings "within thirty days after the decision of the Supreme Court
of Virginia" affirming a death sentence on direct appeal. 25 A new statute
also imposes strict timeliness requirements on death penalty petitioners.
Again, the Supreme Court of Virginia will not even consider the petition
unless it is filed within sixty days of either the United States Supreme
Court's denial of certiorari on direct appeal, or the Court's affirmance of
a conviction, or the expiration of the period for timely filing a petition for
certiorari to the Court.
26
This time frame raises problems. First, there are cases in which the
Supreme Court of Virginia had affirmed convictions on direct appeal
before the statute's effective date, but no counsel had been appointed
within the thirty day period after the affirmance. In these cases, it is thus
unclear whether the Supreme Court of Virginia would be able to impose
the new statutory time limits. A petitioner could also contest that
imposition by reference to the procedure/substance distinction in Vir-
ginia Code section 8.01-1.27 This time, he could argue that the statutory
change affected his substantive rights by denying him of the benefit of
counsel at state habeas.
The same challenge to the application of the new procedures should
be available prospectively for cases affirmed by the Supreme Court of
Virginia after the statute's effective date, but in which the circuit court
fails to appoint counsel within the required thirty day period. Petitioners
will need an attorney to draft theirpetition. If the circuitcourt simply fails
to appoint counsel, the petitioner will not be able to file a petition within
the sixty-day period after disposition in the United States Supreme Court.
In turn, if petitioners are not granted some relief from the court's
own error in these situations, the following scenario could occur. If a
petitioner tries to present a claim, he must do so without the benefit of an
attorney until the circuit court appoints one. In the mean time, before the
tolling of the sixty-day period following the United States Supreme
Court decision on direct appeal, the petitioner somehow must file a
petition with the court. If the petitioner receives counsel before the
expiration of the sixty days, the attorney can fie a "skeletal" petition to
the Supreme Court of Virginia. The petitionerhimselfmay have to do this
if no attorney is appointed in time. The "skeletal petition" is designed
solely to buy time so that a genuine petition can be prepared while
preventing the sixty-day limit from expiring.
24 See also McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467 (1991), and case
summary of McCleskey, Capital Defense Digest, Vol. 4, No. 1, p. 7
(1991); Schlup v. Delo, 115 S. Ct. 851 (1995), and case summary of
Schlup, Capital Defense Digest, Vol. 7, No. 2, p. 4 (1995); Barnes v.
Thompson, 58 F.3d 971 (1995), and case summary of Barnes, Capital
Defense Digest, this issue. See also section III, infra.
25 Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-163.7 (1995).
26 Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-654.1 (1995).
27 See text accompanying note 22, supra.
28 No. SA-93-CA-736 (W.D. Tex., Oct. 12, 1993).
29 Id. See also McFarland v. Scott, 114 S. Ct. 2568 (1994), and case
summary of McFarland, Capital Defense Digest, Vol. 7, No. 1, p. 11
(1994).
30 Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-654(C)(2) (1995).
31 Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-654(C)(3) (1995).
A furtherproblem with this approach is the tendency of some courts
to dismiss "successive and abusive" petitions automatically. In Gosch v.
Collins,28 a federal habeas petitioner had filed a skeletal petition, but it
had been denied on the merits by the district court and this denial affirmed
by the Fifth Circuit. When the petitioner later filed an adequate petition,
the district court dismissed it as "successive and abusive."29 Though
Virginia does not appear to have a "successive and abusive" standard for
multiple petitions, counsel are advised to couch the later, fully developed
petition solely in terms of an amendment to the initial "skeletal petition."
B. Evidentiary Hearings
The amendments to the main state habeas statute make it clear that
the Supreme Court of Virginia not only decides whether to allow the
circuit courts to conduct the evidentiary hearings, but also dictates the
issues the hearing may address.30 If the higher court decides to grant an
evidentiary hearing, the circuit court, after holding the hearing, makes
findings of fact and recommended conclusions of law to the higher
court.31 Otherwise, there is no reason to believe that the Supreme Court
of Virginia's standard for analyzing claims will be any more advanta-
geous to petitioners than the standard of the circuit courts. Presently, the
circuit courts do not hold hearings without genuine issues of disputed
facts. The Attorney General typically files motions to dismiss any
petitions as soon as they are filed. The Attorney General includes
affidavits in support of the motion and attempts tojustify dismissal of the
petition. One representative of the Virginia Capital Resource Center in
Richmond opined that the Supreme Court of Virginia would likely
analyze petitions under the same standard. 32 She also believed that there
will be fewer hearings under the new system than under the old one and
estimated that hearings would be granted in perhaps one percent of all
petitions.33 Though relief has not been granted in any state habeas case
since 1977, now petitioners will have even less of a chance to make their
case for relief under the new system.
C. Execution Dates
Once the Supreme Court of Virginia denies a petitioner's state
habeas claims, the petitioner may apply for a writ of certiorari to the
United States Supreme Court within ninety days.34 Realistically, how-
ever, it appears that petitioners will now not have time for that step. The
legislature also passed a new statute governing execution dates at the
same time it passed the new state habeas amendments. The time frame
is dramatically quick.
First, the Attorney General notifies the trial court in writing of the
need to set an execution date. Next, the trial court must find that one of
four circumstances has been reached in the case.35 If the trial court does
find one of those circumstances, the court must conduct a proceeding to
32 Telephone Interview with Michelle Brace, Staff Attorney of the
Virginia Capital Representation Resource Center (September 25, 1995).
33 Id. As a practical matter, it is not very surprising that the changes
in the state habeas system would lead to fewer grants of evidentiary
hearings. Now, instead of several circuit courts, only one court, the
Supreme Court of Virginia, makes decisions concerning evidentiary
hearings. With only one decision-maker, logically fewerhearings will be
granted.
34 Sup. Ct. R. 13.1 (1990)
35 Va. Code Ann. § 53.1-232.1 (1995). See text accompanying note
15, supra. The statute appears somewhat flawed in that it fails to address
all of the possible contingencies for the disposal of cases once the
Supreme Court of Virginia has denied state habeas relief. For example,
it does not address what happens if the United States Court of Appeals
reverses a district court's grant of habeas relief.
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set the execution date within ten days of the Attorney General's request.
Finally, it must set the execution date within sixty days of that proceed-
ing.
36
This accelerated process makes the power of United States District
Courts to grant stays ofexecution ofparamountimportance. InMcFarland
v. Scot 37, the United States Supreme Courtheld that District Courts have
the power to grant stays to effectuate federal petitioners' rights to
appointment of counsel. Because there are so many tasks that an attorney
mustperform during both state and federal habeas review,3 8 and because
Virginia's new statute for execution dates hastens the process so much
that there will be no time for federal habeas review at all if the Attorney
General's request follows the Supreme Court of Virginia's denial of state
habeas relief (i.e., the date is set within seventy days of the Attorney
General's request), a petitioner's case becomes essentially hopeless
without such stays.39
III. THE PRACTICAL TASK FOR ATTORNEYS
The most important lesson to be derived from the introduction of the
new procedures is how the immense workload required of counsel for a
death-row inmate on state habeas is made even more onerous by the
statutory changes. Anyone appointed as counsel in a state habeas case
should immediately ask for co-counsel. The shortened time frame
heightens the urgency. Even two attorneys are probably not enough, but
two are probably all the court will allow a petitioner.
The attorneys will have their work cut out for them. Massive
reinvestigation of the entire case is required, with special emphasis on
information pertinent to the ineffectiveness of the petitionerxs trial
counsel, potential violations of Brady v. Maryland40 by the Common-
wealth, and prosecutorial,judicial, and police misconduct. As to ineffec-
tive assistance of counsel, under Strickland v. Washington41 habeas
counsel must demonstrate that trial counsel's performance was deficient
in that it fell below some objective standard of reasonableness, and that
this deficient performance resulted in prejudice to the client. As such,
habeas counsel must reinvestigate much more than record errors evident
from the trial transcript. Habeas counsel must go back over the evidence
of guilt, innocence, and mitigation with a fine tooth comb. Without
reinvestigating the entire case, habeas counsel will have no way of
knowing what trial counsel could have found, and no way to judge
whether trial counsel did perform adequately under Strickland.
Habeas counsel must also reinvestigate the case to discover poten-
tial Brady violations, and prosecutorial,'12 judicial, and jury misconduct.
The United States Supreme Court's recent decision in Kyles v. Whitley43
opens even more avenues for habeas counsel to investigate as to Brady
violations. 44 Again, habeas counsel has no way of knowing what the
36 Va. Code Ann. § 53.1-232.1 (1995).
37 114 S. Ct. 2568 (1994). See also case summary of McFarland,
Capital Defense Digest, Vol. 7, No. 1, p. 11 (1994).
38 See section III, infra.
39 The United States Supreme Court prefers that state courts grant
the necessary stays of execution. "Except in the most extraordinary
circumstances, an application for a stay will not be entertained unless the
relief requested has first been sought in the appropriate court or courts
below or from a judge or judges thereof." Sup. Ct. R. 23.3 (1990). See
also Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880,895-96 (1983). However, the new
statute's harsh standards for granting stays makes the Supreme Court's
preference a moot issue, and thus renders the power of the district courts
to grant stays very important.
40 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
41 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
42 See, e.g., Amadeo v. Zant, 486 U.S. 214 (1988) (prosecution
directed under-representation of minorities and women injury array).
prosecution may have withheld, or what misconduct that prosecutors,
judges, or jurors may have engaged in, without thoroughly reviewing
every aspect of the case. These issues are all available for the first time
at state habeas, and so would not have been addressed during any
investigations conducted by the defense prior to trial.
Additionally, state habeas counsel must attempt from the beginning
to request experts and discovery. Counsel should request these immedi-
ately due to the speed of the state habeas process. Also, if apetitioner does
not request these during state habeas, that fact can be used against the
petitioner on federal habeas review, underKeeney v. Tamayo-Reyes.45 In
Keeney, the United States Supreme Court extended the "cause and
prejudice" standard for default articulated in Wainwright v. Sykes
46 to
instances where a petitioner had failed to develop a material fact in state
court.47 Recently, lower federal courts have been using Keeney more
frequently to default claims based on failure of counsel to investigate
certain facts at trial. 48 Under Keeney, a petitioner's failure to request
experts at state habeas may result in denial of such a request in federal
court.
Habeas counsel must also learn a massive, complex body of law in
order to serve their clients effectively. Issues such as retroactivity4 9 and
procedural defaultrequire much study and thus even more time of habeas
counsel. Counsel must learn how to preserve issues to preventprocedural
default and to avoid federal determinations that state court denials of
relief rested on "adequate and independent state grounds."
'50
Finally, state habeas counsel should request outside help as well.
State habeas cases are extremely complicated, developing very rapidly.
They are very different from any other types of cases that lawyers
typically handle. It is impossible for counsel to learn in one day every-
thing needed to perform the work competently. At this writing, the status
of the Virginia Capital Representation Resource Center, the most poten-
tially helpful resource, was uncertain due to actual and pending cuts in
funding. To the extent that the Resource Center continues its work, the
Center can alert attorneys to problem areas and can help attorneys focus
on vital issues, thereby saving counsel valuable time. The Center can also
provide many other types of assistance, as it publishes a quarterly
newsletter containing relevant state and federal case summaries, "how
to's", and other useful information. Any attorney appointed to a habeas
case not receiving the Center's newsletter should call the Center and ask
to be put on the mailing list and to receive all back issues. The Center may
be contacted at 804-643-6845.
Both the Center, to the extent it continues, and the Virginia Capital
Case Clearinghouse can also put counsel in touch with experienced
habeas lawyers who may be able to provide counsel with additional help.
The Clearinghouse may be reached at 540-463-8557.
43 115 S. Ct. 1555 (1995). See also case summary of Kyles, Capital
Defense Digest, this issue.
44 See also Barnes v. Thompson, 58 F.3d 971 (1995), and case
summary of Barnes, Capital Defense Digest, this issue.
45 504 U.S. 1 (1991).
46433 U.S. 72 (1977).
47 Keeney, 504 U.S. at 8.
48 See, e.g., Gray v. Thompson, 58 F.3d 59, 68 (1995) (concurring
opinion); Barnes v. Thompson, 58 F.3d 971 (1995).
4 9 See Teague v.Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989); Butler v.McKellar, 494
U.S. 407 (1990), and case summary of Butler, Capital Defense Digest,
Vol. 3, No. 1, p. 2 (1990); Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484 (1990), and case
summary of Saffle, Capital Defense Digest, Vol. 3, No. 1, p. 3; Sawyer
v. Smith, 497 U.S. 227 (1990), and case summary of Sawyer, Vol. 3, No.
1, p. 4 (1990).
50 See Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977); Coleman v.
Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (1991), and case summary of Coleman, Capital
Defense Digest, Vol. 4, No. 1, p. 4 (1991).
